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ABSTRACT
This research uses the concept of service blueprinting to separate the online platform into several individual services. This
research uses signaling game theory to investigate if service providers should cooperate with Yahoo according to information
asymmetry. By using the concept of game theory, service providers can judge the decision of cooperation. This research uses
signaling game theory to investigate the interaction of online service providers and decide if the cooperation is the best strategy.
In particular, the payoffs under cooperation will be further evaluated by Shapley value. Shapley value is used to measure the
fairness of profit after cooperation.
Keywords: Alliance, service, signaling game, shapley value.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, the popularity of Internet changes industries. Taking service industry as the example, traditional mindset of service
industry is to interact with customers but Internet somehow disrupted it. In particular, the concept of service blueprint was also
proposed by Bitner [1] to separate process of hotel services. However, Internet enables variety of online services such as
shopping, auction, and fortune telling on either traditional portal (e.g., Yahoo) or social media portal (e.g., Facebook). New
online services are furnished to increase the time to stay on the website that may enhance the benefits of portal and service
providers. In a changing environment of Internet, the relationship between service providers and portal owner has become
extremely significant. This research investigates the strategic alliance (cooperation) between service providers and portal by
discovering the incentives to form alliance and discusses the appropriateness of resources allocation of alliance.
The online portal such as Yahoo is a special example that provides different types of services such as weather, stock, auction,
fortune telling, etc. Those services are furnished by independent service providers but cooperate each other based on joint
purpose. This research uses the concept of service blueprinting [2-4] to separate the online platform (e.g., Yahoo) into several
individual services. We consider all service providers are in a constructed ecosystem. Owing to limited resources of each
service provider, providing best service to customers not only can maximize profits but also construct joint belief of
collaboration to create superior service value.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research uses signaling game theory to investigate if service providers should cooperate with Yahoo according to
information asymmetry. The strategic cooperation of those service providers is a type of alliance. By using the concept of game
theory, service providers can judge the decision of cooperation. Online portal also takes into account online traffic, service
features, and service quality to make decisions for cooperation. After identifying the decision of cooperation, we discuss the
payoffs of cooperation to help company make best move. Finally, we use Shapley value to investigate the fairness of
cooperation by estimating the fair payoffs under cooperation. Three research questions will be discussed: (a) how online portal
selects service providers to cooperate as form an alliance?, (b) what are the payoffs after cooperation or no cooperation?, and
(c) how to achieve fairness of payoffs under cooperation?.
This research uses signaling game theory to investigate the interaction of online service providers and decide if the cooperation
is the best strategy. Meanwhile, the payoffs can be estimated by literature and observed data. Four situations will be discussed
between portal and service providers (2 X 2): separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium. Service providers also can
choose best partner to cooperate after evaluation. In particular, the payoffs under cooperation will be further evaluated by
Shapley value. Shapley value is used to measure the fairness of profit after cooperation. Hence, this study aims to examine the
fairness of profit after alliance and attract service providers to provide core services with efficient strategic movement. The
goal is to construct a concept of cooperative service alliance.
This research assumes two players in the signaling game. P1 (online service provider) has private information which means
only P1 knows the quality of furnished service but P2 (portal) does not know the truth. The probability of high or low quality
of service from P1 is given as p. The action of P1 is sending signal S=(fee, free). While P2 receives signal S, the probability of
true type of P1 is q’ and will take actions A=(alliance, no alliance). According to signaling game theory, we aim to know (a)
what will be the type of signal should send for different service provider?, (b) what will be the probability of q’ (type of P1 | S)
that P2 thinks the probability of S for P1?, and (c) what will be the action for P2 when receiving the signal S?.
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Table 1 Definitions of variables in signaling game
Payoff of service provider
Payoff of portal
X

fees that customer pays for the service

C

reqauired cost on portal

T

the benefit of exposure on portal

Rc
RTcp
ER

benefit that charge service providers
benefit from click rate
the external benefit from increased
number of customers by cooperating with
service providers

Tcp
R

cost of click rate

Oc

the maintenance cost of alliance

the benefit of customer to reuse the
service
Table 2 Payoff in signaling game
Payoff

Payoff of
service
provider
and portal

Elements of payoff

Rc+RTcp+ER-Oc
X-C+T-Tcp+R
RTcp
X+R
Rc+RTcp+ER-Oc
-C+T-Tcp+R
RTcp
R
Rc+RTcp+ER-Oc
X-C+T-Tcp+R
RTcp
X+R
Rc+RTcp+ER-Oc
-C+T-Tcp+R
RTcp
R

Figure 1 The signaling game of portal and service provider
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In the separating equilibrium, there are two situations as follows:
(a) High quality service provider sends charge (fee) signal and cooperates with portal. In the condition of
>
, high
quality service provider may help enhance both reputations by furnishing good services and attract customers. This indicates
payoff of cooperation is greater than payoff of non-cooperation. In other words, portal may cooperate with service provider.
Because of high quality service from service provider, the network effect increases the payoff of cooperation for portal. That is,
>
.
(b) Low quality service provider sends free signal and portal decides not to ally (cooperate). In the condition of
>
,
the payoff of service provider for non-cooperation is greater than cooperation. The reason is payoff may be damaged owing to
cooperating with portal without furnishing high quality service. That is, service provider decides not to cooperate. To portal,
because cooperating with low quality service provider may damage own payoff and reputation, we infer
>
.
In summary, this research aims to investigate the strategic movements between online portal and service providers. By using
Shapley value, the distribution of profit can be fairly reallocate under cooperation. Moreover, a new concept of service alliance
can be constructed by our model with verification.
CONTRIBUTION
This research uses signaling game theory to discover the way of service alliance based on information asymmetry between
service provider and portal. We also use Shapley value to examine the fairness of payoff for alliance. The major contribution is
to discover a online service alliance with fair payoff for both service provider and portal.
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